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C919 May Be Largely Limited To Chinese Market
C919很可能只限于中国市场
By Bradley Perrett
Source: Aviation Week & Space Technology
Chances are rising that the Comac C919 will be largely limited to the Chinese market, as the manufacturer works toward local airworthiness certification while seeing no sure path to the desired FAA endorsement of the type.
有迹象表明,中国商飞的C919很可能只限于中国市场,因为中国商飞只致力于本土适航认证,看不到FAA介入型号认证的迹象。
The Chinese market is big, so sales of perhaps 1,000 units remain plausible, in the opinion of program officials. But the 158-seat narrowbody's prospects for making much of an impact on the wider market, perhaps never large, are diminishing.
中国官方的意见是,中国市场是巨大的,卖上千架不是不可能。但158座级的窄体飞机,其对整个飞机市场的影响力,也许本来就不大,何况如今还在缩小。
The problem emerged in 2011 and is still unresolved. Delays in Comac's earlier program, the ARJ21 regional jet, are holding up FAA recognition of the certification competence of the Civil Aviation Administration of China (CAAC) (AW&ST Sept. 12, 2011, p. 24). That casts doubt on the FAA's eventual acceptance of the CAAC's current work on C919 and therefore the Chinese type certificate. Without Western airworthiness endorsement, the C919 cannot be sold in main commercial aircraft markets outside of China.
2011年冒出的问题至今仍然没有解决。中国商飞前一个项目ARJ21支线飞机的延期,停留在FAA对CAAC适航认证能力的考查上(参见AW&ST 杂志2011年9月12日地第24页)。值得怀疑的是FAA能否最终认可CAAC当前在C919项目上所作的工作以及此后中方颁发的型号合格证。没有西方适航当局的认可,C919不可能卖到中国以外的商用飞机主流市场。
“As we see it, this is a highly complex situation,” says an executive closely involved in the C919 certification effort. “Because the FAA's position is affected by the ARJ21, we currently have no way of resolving this problem.” For the moment, the C919 program can only work on obtaining CAAC certification and hope the Chinese authority and the FAA can come to a helpful agreement. Comac has not given up, the executive adds: FAA endorsement is still a C919 objective.
“正如我们看到的,这是一个非常复杂的局面”,某深度介入C919适航工作的高管说。“因为FAA的态度受到ARJ21的影响,我们现在没有办法解决这一问题。”目前,C919项目只能基于取CAAC的适航证开展工作,希望中国局方能与FAA达成一项互惠协议。中国商飞没有放弃,该高管补充说:争取FAA认可仍然是C919的目标。
Under a Bilateral Air Safety Agreement, the FAA is coaching and supervising the CAAC in dealing with the ARJ21 certification application. If and when the process is correctly completed, with the issue or refusal of a type certificate, the FAA will recognize the CAAC as a certifying authority. The FAA is similarly helping the Japanese Civil Aviation Bureau, with the Mitsubishi Aircraft MRJ regional jet as the test case. The FAA and European Aviation Safety Authority support authorities of other countries in this way because Americans and Europeans also fly on the foreign aircraft.
在双边航空安全协议框架下,FAA正在指导和监督CAAC处理ARJ21的适航申请。这一过程能否以及什么时候能正确地完成是个问题,不排除拒绝颁发型号合格证,FAA将查证作为适航审定当局的CAAC。FAA正以类似的方式帮助日本民用航空局,并以三菱重工的MRJ支线飞机项目作为测试的案例。FAA和欧洲航空安全局(EASA)还以同样的方式支持其他国家的适航当局,因为美国和欧洲也飞外国飞机。
The ARJ is not now expected to be certified until the end of 2014, by which time the CAAC will have accumulated at least three years of C919 work with little or no FAA involvement. The issue is whether the FAA will recognize the validity of that work retrospectively once the CAAC proves itself with the ARJ21. The FAA would have to accept that its Chinese counterpart had followed the same procedures with the C919 as it used for the ARJ21. Last year, an official familiar with the FAA's options suggested that it could do so. Comac officials have no assurance that it will, however. And the FAA's confidence can only decline as the volume of unrecognized work rises.
照现在的估计,ARJ不会在2014年底之前取得适航证,到那时CAAC在少有或没有FAA的介入下至少已经在C919项目上工作了3年。问题是,一旦CAAC在ARJ21项目上证明了自己的能力,FAA是否认可CAAC在C919项目上工作的有效性。也许FAA会要求中国同行按在ARJ21项目上使用的相同程序来处理C919。去年,某熟悉FAA选项的官员提出也许会这样做。然而,中国商飞官方尚未确定将如何做。而FAA的信心必将随着需要查证的工作量的上升而下降。
Customers of the C919 have expressed a desire for FAA endorsement of the certification, even though they are all Chinese and therefore do not need it. There is no suggestion the CAAC would be soft on Comac; on the contrary, it is repeatedly reported that the Chinese authority is tougher than the FAA.
C919的客户已经表明需要FAA介入适航审查的愿望,尽管他们都是中国客户,因此不需要它。无迹象表明CAAC会对中国商飞持温和态度;正好相反,反复报道的是中国局方比FAA的审查更严格。
The C919's competitiveness in non-Chinese markets has long been questioned, especially since 2010-11, when Airbus and Boeing launched new versions of the A320 and 737 with engines the same as or similar to the CFM Leap 1 on Comac's aircraft. This year's schedule slippages and rejection of a composite material for the center wing box have further diminished the C919's market clout (AW&ST Aug. 19, p. 39).
C919在非中国市场上的竞争性一直是问题,特别是2011年11月以后,空客和波音启动了A320和737的改型,所用的发动机与中国商飞所使用的CFM Leap 1相同或类似。而今年研制进度的滑坡以及拒用复合材料中央翼盒进一步降低了C919的市场冲击力(参见AW&ST杂志8月19日第39页) 。
But even if the aircraft proved to be seriously outmatched, production subsidies could conceivably allow Comac, itself a state agency, to sell it—providing the C919 had the certification that made it eligible for the market.
即使飞机被证明严重落后,生产补贴会使中国商飞这样的央企照样销售飞机,照样发给C919适航证,照样在市场上游刃有余。
Subsidies are likely anyway. The announced C919 development budget is 58 billion yuan ($9.5 billion) but the real figure is probably 50% higher, says an industry executive whose company, not a competitor to Comac, has studied the issue. Adding interest, a production run of 1,000 C919s would demand recovery of well over $20 million in development costs per aircraft, a figure the market is not likely to bear.
补贴好像是万能钥匙。公布的C919研制费是580亿人民币(约合95亿美元),但实际费用可能要超出50%,某非中国商飞竞争商的行业高管研究了问题后说。加上利息,以生产1000架C919 计算,每架飞机需要回收研发成本2000多万美元,这是一个市场无法承受的数字。
Comac's Chinese engineers are probably earning about half as much as their counterparts at Boeing or Airbus, but the C919 program is also employing many very costly expatriate foreign engineers. Most important, inexperienced managers cannot be expected to know the most efficient ways of developing an airliner, so program costs should be unusually high, says the executive.
中国商飞的中国工程师也许挣了他们波音或空客同行们一半的钱,但是C919项目还雇用了成本很高的海归工程师。最重要的是,不要指望那些没有经验的管理者们会懂得研制一架飞机的最有效方法,所以项目成本会异乎寻常的高,某行业高管说。
Two years ago Comac had to ask for top-up development funding from the government, which agreed to an unknown amount. The money seems to be budgeted but not assured, however, because Comac has to secure its funds every year from the government, industry officials say.
两年前,中国商飞就向上级政府追加研制费,获批的数目不得而知。钱好像打进了预算但不能保证,然而,中国商飞必须逐年从政府拿钱,行业官员们说。
Since the top-up was approved, Comac has added about a year to the development schedule, implying another year of salaries. It has a three-month buffer in its current schedule, which includes a first flight late in 2015.
自从追加的研制费获批,中国商飞已经将研制时间表增加了一年,这意味着要增加一年的薪水。在现在的时间表上有3个月的缓冲期,包括在2015年底首飞。
Production costs of the C919 will have to be higher than those of the A320 and 737 at first, since Airbus and Boeing have very well-honed manufacturing processes. But studies by the same outside company suggest that when the C919 production line is mature, Comac should be able build more, cheaply, thanks largely to lower wages.
首先是C919的生产成本必定高出A320和737,因为空客和波音具有精心打造的制造流程。但是,相同的外部公司研究认为,当C919生产线成熟时,中国商飞应该能造更多更廉价的飞机,主要是由于较低的工资。
Comac has forecast production of 2,200 C919s and an eventual steady rate of 150 a year. Executives who have studied the program say the actual total will probably be about half of the forecast. They do not see reason to be more pessimistic, because Chinese demand can probably soak up 1,000 C919s, providing the aircraft performs reasonably well. The key performance target is an operating cost 10% below those of current-production 737s and A320s.
中国商飞预测C919的生产总量2200架,最终可稳定在150架的年产量。研究项目的高官们说,实际生产总架数也许只有预测数的一半。无须看更悲观的原因,因为中国对C919的需求可能缩减到1000架,这为该飞机项目执行提供了合理的理由。C919关键的性能目标是使用成本比在产的737和A320下降10%。
The Chinese manufacturer is investing in advanced automatic fabrication equipment, which should cut costs if kept running at an optimum level, as well as guarantee precision. Its new plant outside Shanghai is mostly a final assembly line, however. Major airframe modules will come from Avic, whose efficiency and investment will therefore heavily influence costs.
中国商飞正在为先进的自动化加工设备进行投资,如果能运转在最佳水平上,同时能保证精度,这将会削减成本。然而,上海以外的新厂很可能是一条总装线。主机体部件来自中航工业(AVIC),他们的效率和投资将显著影响成本。
The quality of Avic's production may be an issue. Comac has been dissatisfied with ARJ21 assemblies from Avic, even though that separate state group is quite capable of excellent work. For example, it produces A320 outer wings, to Airbus's great satisfaction.
AVIC的生产质量可能是个问题。中国商飞对AVIC的装配的ARJ21不满意,即使该独立的国家企业集团具有相当优秀的工作能力。例如,它为A320生产外翼,得到空客的青睐。
Comac is leaning toward aluminum-lithium for the skin of the C919 fuselage, but only in the cylindrical sections, since it does not want Avic to try making the difficult double curvatures of the nose and tail with an unfamiliar material. Comac is somewhat obliged to use the Alcoa metal, because it no longer has a composite center wing box but still needs to meet a government requirement for 30% advanced materials in the airframe. The tail and movable surfaces will be of carbon-fiber composite.
中国商飞正在尝试用铝锂合金做C919的机身蒙皮,但仅用于圆筒形机身段,因为不打算要AVIC用不熟悉的材料来试制难度较大的双曲面机头和机尾。中国商飞不得不使用美铝(Alcoa)的金属材料,因为C919不再使用复合材料的中央翼盒,但仍需按政府要求,在机体上使用30%的先进材料。机尾和活动面将采用碳纤维复合材料。
The design is currently overweight, says an executive familiar with development, but the problem is not considered serious. The cause is mainly in the weight of equipment, not the structure.
现行设计超重,某熟悉该项目研发的高官说,但超重问题不算严重。超重主要由设备引起,而非结构。
Assembly of the first prototype should be underway by the end of 2014, assuming no further delays. A delay announced in August was the program's second; the first was not revealed officially but was reported by Aviation Week (AW&ST June 17, p. 96).
首架试验机的装配应该于2014年底进行,假设不再发生延期。8月份宣布的延期是项目的第二次延期;第一次延期官方没有正式公布,但航空周刊作了报道(参见AW&ST杂志6月17日第96页)。
The C919's iron bird, a structure on the ground on which systems are tested, was due to be operational around the end of 2013 with mechanical and hydraulic systems. By mid 2014 it should be working with all systems.
C919的铁鸟,即试验系统的地面结构,2013年底前后机械和液压系统可投入使用。到2014年中,所有系统可望投入运行。
The ARJ21, meanwhile, should now be in the last of 12 years of development. The first two production aircraft are due to be completed this month. Judging from recent progress in assembly at Comac's old Shanghai factory, at least one of them will be.
与此同时,目前ARJ21应该经历了12年的研制了。头两架生产型飞机本月即可完成。从中国商飞在上海的老厂装配进度判断,至少可以完成两架中的一架。
ARJ21 production is said to be supported by a government order for 50 aircraft as official transports. Comac is also selling 30 of the type to itself; Chengdu Airlines, owned by the manufacturer, will be the first operator. Contracts with other airlines probably had little binding effect when signed and, following the enormous development delays, even less now. Shortly after program launch, the ARJ21 was originally due to go into service in 2007.
据说ARJ21的生产得到政府50架公务机订单的支持。中国商飞还自产自销30架,由中国商飞控股的成都航空将成为首家用户。与其他航空公司的合同也许签订时就没有多少约束力,加之大量研制延期,其实所剩无几。项目启动后不久,ARJ21初定于2017年投入使用。
(以下是原文网页截图)
http://www.aviationweek.com/Arti ... -646219.xml&p=1
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